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PRE-TRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDUREt
P. Raymond Lamonica *
FOURTH AMENDMENT ARTICLE 1, SECTION 5 RIGHTS-
SEARCH OF PERSON INCIDENT TO ARREST
The Robinson- GustafsonI rationale for search of the person incident to
a full custody arrest was examined and applied in State v. Breaux.2 The
defendant was stopped by a policeman for speeding. The officer issued a
summons and was awaiting routine confirmation of ownership of the
vehicle by radio when another officer drove up. The second officer, without
communicating with the first, opened the door to defendant's automobile
and searched it. After finding an empty beer can, the second officer walked
over to defendant and asked him how many beers he had drunk. The
t Author's Note: In the pre-trial criminal procedure area, because of the
number of cases and issues and their often being closely tied to unique factual
settings, it is impossible in a limited space to present a comprehensive or completely
representative view of the activity of the court during the term. The cases are selected
primarily because it is believed they present new questions or new treatments.
Analysis is, of course, greatly abbreviated.
Because many of the decisions are by a close vote and because of the developing
nature of the legal principles, emphasis is often placed on the "language" instead of
the "holding." The reader is warned to note the same. Finally, since many of the
pre-trial issues have traditionally been treated as United States Constitutional issues,
it may be a distortion to examine state developments without reference to United
States Supreme Court developments. Significant United States Supreme Court
pre-trial procedure cases are listed for reference.
FOURTH AMENDMENT: South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976) (auto
search); United States v. Martinez-Fuente, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (border stop and search);
Andresen v. Maryland, 96 S. Ct. 2737 (1976) (search warrant description); United
States v. Santana, 96 S. Ct. 2406 (1976) (arrest); Texas v. White, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)
(auto search); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (arrest).
FIFrH AMENDMENT: Andresen v. Maryland, 96 S. Ct. 2737 (1976) (fourth amend-
ment, fifth amendment relationship, seizure of papers); Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S. Ct. 2240
(1976) (Miranda silence as impeachment). United States v. Mandujano, 96 S. Ct.
1768 (1976) (Miranda, perjury); Beckwith v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1612 (1976)
(custodial interrogation); Ohio v. Gallagher, 96 S. Ct. 1438 (1976) (custodial
interrogation).
DISCOVERY: United States v. Agurs, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976) (Brady v. Maryland
amplified).
GUILTY PLEAS: Henderson v. Morgan, 96 S. Ct. 2253 (1976) (factual basis of guilt).
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S.260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973). See also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
2. 329 So. 2d 696 (La. 1976).
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defendant replied that he had drunk only one. The second officer then "put
his hand on the right hand pocket of the blue jean pants worn by the
defendant . . . squeezed, felt something soft and put his hand in and
dragged out a small cellophane bag containing two marijuana cigarettes." 3
The state maintained that the search and seizure was valid because it
was "incident to a lawful arrest" and that defendant was arrested because he
was lawfully detained.4 Thus the court was presented, apparently for the
first time, with the proposition that the stopping of a person for a traffic
violation constitutes an arrest which authorizes a search of the person
incident to that arrest.5
The court correctly rejected the state's contention and concluded that
"not every authorized detention may constitute an 'arrest' which justifies
incident to it a search of the person. The arrests contemplated which do
justify a search of the person incident to it are full custody arrests reasonably
and lawfully made with the purpose of booking the person . . . for the
offense 'charged'."6
Since the first officer previously had issued the summons in this case
the facts presented a rather simple situation: there had been objective actions
which indicated a clear intent not to place the defendant in full custody
arrest for the purpose of booking. As yet no Louisiana case has addressed
the more difficult factual situations requiring a determination of what
circumstances will authorize a full custody arrest to afford reliance upon the
Robinson-Gustafson rationale. In misdemeanor cases the Code of Criminal
Procedure appears to authorize an arrest and booking7 but gives the officer
discretion to issue a summons in lieu of booking "if he [the officer] has
reasonable ground to believe that the person will appear upon a summons. "8
In light of Breaux there is serious doubt that an officer who exercises
3. Id. at 698.
4. The state relied heavily upon the definition of arrest in LA. CODE CRIM. P.
art. 201: "Arrest is the taking of one person into custody by another .... There
must be an actual restraint of the person. The restraint may be imposed by force or
may result from . . . submission .... "
5. Such a proposition is not dependent upon the existence of independent
probable cause to search; neither is it predicated upon officer self-protection
grounds. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
6. 329 So. 2d at 699 (Emphasis added).
7. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 213(3).
8. Id. art. 211. LA. R.S. 32:391 (as amended by Act 230 of the 1976 regular
session) appears to diminish somewhat the officer's discretion to arrest and book for
violations of Title 32, but upon failure to post bond, if required, a full custody arrest
with booking appears to be authorized. See also LA. R.S. 32:411 (as amended by Acts
185 and 520 of the 1976 regular session).
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his apparently unfettered discretion to arrest and book in misdemeanor cases
will be able-without a further showing-to avail himself of the Robinson-
Gustafson search of the person incident to arrest. The nature of the further
showing is indicated by Justice Tate speaking for the majority, "we
expressly do not hold. . . that an arbitrary or non-customary decision of an
officer to arrest a person instead of to issue a summons for a misdemeanor
will justify as reasonable any search incident to it. 9
In both Robinson and Gustafson the authorization of full custody
arrests by the facts or regulations was not challenged.' 0 Breaux indicates
that a "non-customary" or arbitrary full custody arrest will not support an
incidental search of the person. In that connection the court did not consider
the suggestion of Justice Stewart, concurring in Gustafson, that "a persua-
sive claim might have been made . . . that the custodial arrest . . . for a
minor traffic offense violated his right under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment." 1 1
Breaux clearly holds that if the officer has objectively indicated an
intent not to book, a search is unauthorized; the dicta goes further and
indicates that even if the officer has not decided against a custodial arrest, he
cannot search if such an arrest and booking would be "non-customary."
While the court did not consider whether full custody arrests for minor
traffic violations would be per se unconstitutional as Justice Stewart
suggested, the "non-customary" standard might make such a determina-
tion unnecessary since political realities doubtless would prevent customary
full custody arrests for minor traffic offenses.
The court does not indicate upon whom the burden of showing a
customary or non-customary full custody arrest situation rests. Since the
search incident to a full custody arrest is an exception to the per se warrant
requirement, a strong argument can be made in favor of requiring the state to
show the customary nature of the full custody arrest.' 2 However, until a
holding on this question is obtained it is incumbent upon counsel for
defendant to develop a record reflecting the customary or non-customary
practice of effecting full custody arrests under the particular
circumstances. I'
9. 329 So. 2d at 700 n.4.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
11. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973).,
12. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Pre-trial Criminal Procedure,
36 LA. L. REV. 575, 592 (1976).
13. Justice Marcus' concurring opinion indicates a belief that if, under the facts
of Breaux, the officer had not previously decided to issue a summons he could have
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KNOWN INFORMANTS-CREDIBILITY
Last year's review of the cases dealing with the use of informers'
hearsay to establish probable cause concluded that "one might infer that the
mere naming of an informant is sufficient to establish credibility, or that
credibility is not a consideration when the informant is known." 14 In State
v. Searle, " the court moved closer to accepting the per se credibility of a
known informant when the affiant is presenting a hearsay statement based
upon that informant's assertions. The court noted,
"Significantly, . . . [the officer's] informer was not a confiden-
tial, unnamed informer. He was, instead, a named and non'-
professional informer . . .,,16
As a basis for that distinction the court relied upon United States v.
Darensbourg,'7 in its distinction between professional and non-
professional informers. The court notes,
"The rule growing out of these cases [Aguilar-Spinelli and
progeny] should not be applied as readily to an eyewitness such as...
[here]. An ordinary citizen complaining of a burglary would not
usually be familiar to the police, or have had occasion to inform in the
past. As a consequence his credibility could not be vouched for by the
officer."18
Thus, Louisiana may have accepted an 'identified-non-professional"
category of informants not controlled by the "two-prong" test of Aguilar-
effected a full custody arrest and searched the person incident to it. He also suggests
that a self-protective frisk would have justified the seizure. With respect to the
former contention, neither Gustafson nor Robinson authorize an incident search
where there are not good grounds for a full custody arrest. The latter contention could
be supported under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143 (1972), if the officer had reason to fear for his safety. First, he could have
frisked and then if he had reason to believe a weapon was present he could have
searched. Since in Breaux he felt soft matter, not indicating a weapon, it is difficult to
support an ability to search after the frisk. Justice Marcus' literal reading of LA. CODE
CRIM. P. art. 215.1 which appears to authorize such a search is believed to be
unconstitutional under Terry. Neither Adams nor Terry authorize a general explor-
atory search for evidence in the "stop and frisk" situation.
14. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-
Pre-trial Criminal Procedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 575, 583 (1976).
15. 339 So. 2d 1194 (La. 1976).
16. Id. at 1197 (Emphasis added).
17. 520 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1975). See also The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Pre-trial Criminal Procedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 575,
584 n.42 (1976).
18. 339 So. 2d at 1198.
[Vol. 37
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Spinelli. 19 While the application of that rationale in Searle is not objection-
able, it should be recognized that "identified-non-professional" informants
can vary with respect to credibility considerations as well as unnamed
professionals. Since the ultimate question is the existence of probable
cause, some consideration of credibility characteristics should always be
given, even when the informant is identified and non-professional. It may
not be unreasonable to assume that a victim of a crime is credible because he
identifies himself and because of his relationship to the criminal activity, but
it might well be unreasonable to assume that every identified and apparently
non-professional informant is credible.2" A per se credibility rule should be
carefully considered before acceptance.2 1 Even if such a rule were adopted,
it should not lessen the requirement that there be a showing that the
informant obtained his information in a reliable manner. The court appro-
priately might require a stronger showing of the reliability of the manner of
obtaining the information when there is reliance upon the presumption of
credibility in identified non-professional informer situations.
SEARCH WARRANTS-VERACITY OF AFFIANT
Prior to State v. Cox, 22 State v. Melson23 and State v. Giordano 24
appeared to have resolved the question of the circumstances in which a
search warrant application purporting to rely upon an unidentified informant
could be challenged. In Melson Justice Dixon's well-reasoned opinion
concluded that the defendant had a right to traverse affiants' allegations
about an unidentified informer in a search warrant affidavit concluding that
this ability to traverse was necessary to protect against unwarranted privacy
invasions, to protect the integrity of the judicial process and to insure the
existence of probable cause. 25
To prevent unwarranted attempts to controvert the affiant's statements,
the court in Giordano, a companion case, held that in making allegations
challenging the lack of veracity of the affiant, "the defendant must
19. Briefly, that test requires establishing (i) the credibility of the informant and
(2) the reliability of the manner in which the informant gained his information in the
warrant application. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-75
Term-Pre-trial Criminal Procedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 575, 579 (1976).
20. See United States v. Darensbourg, 520 F.2d 985, 989 (5th Cir. 1975) (Gold-
berg, J., dissenting).
21. A magistrate might be prudent in questionable instances to require produc-
tion of the known informer in order to personally assess his credibility.
22. 330 So. 2d 284 (La. 1976).
23. 284 So. 2d 873 (La. 1973).
24. 284 So. 2d 880 (La. 1973).
25. 284 So. 2d at 874-75.
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demonstrate a genuine issue to enable the court to regulate proof, and.to
allow the state an opportunity to produce the evidence relevant to the
issue. '26
In Cox, the defendant filed a motion to suppress alleging "that the
information was not furnished to [the affiant] by any informer and that [the
affiant] either intentionally or unintentionally misrepresented the facts in
executing the oath in support of the search warrant." At the hearing
addressed to this issue the defendant produced evidence that the only
persons in the apartment within the time frame mentioned by the informant
were three co-defendants and one other named person who denied being the
informer.
After reversal upon rehearing, the majority opinion concluded, "the
motion to suppress merely alleged that the information furnished by affiant
in support of the issuance of the warrant was false . . . . No facts were
alleged to support these conclusions." 2 7 Citing Giordano the court indi-
cated further that a defendant cannot controvert the truthfulness of an affiant
... without demonstrating a genuine issue on (sic) the affiant's veracity
supported by convincing allegations of fact which, if proven, would
establish the falsity of the affidavit." 
28
In light of the facts of Cox the language creates substantial confusion.
It appears that the court is refusing to allow the defendant to traverse the
veracity of the affiant because of a pleading defect, i.e., the failure to
include in the motion to suppress allegations of the specific facts which
support the claim of falsity. Such a position is certainly tenable and
moreover appears to be required in light of Giordano. But, the specificity of
pleading requirement addresses itself to the question of whether the court
will allow testimony directed toward the issue of affiant veracity to be
presented at all. The trial court in Cox did allow evidence directed to
affiant's veracity to be adduced based upon the general and deficient
pleading. At that point the evidence presented certainly must be seen as
supplementing the general pleading or the defendant should be given an
opportunity to expressly amend the pleading.
29
There is no doubt in this writer's mind that the facts adduced clearly
established, at a minimum, a "genuine issue of fact" with respect to the
affiant's veracity. The testimony reflected that only one non-defendant was
present, and the officer-affiant admitted that he was not the informer. The
26. 284 So. 2d at 881.
27. 330 So. 2d at 292 (La. 1976) (Emphasis added).
28. Id. (Emphasis added).
29. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 488, 1154.
[Vol. 37
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majority suggests that all of this evidence did not establish a "genuine
issue" because of the possibility that one of the co-defendants, who failed to
appear and for whom a warrant was issued, might be the informant.
Clearly, that proprosition-as far-fetched as it might be-goes to the
merits of the issue of affiant veracity rather than to the question of the right
to traverse. It simply cannot reasonably be suggested that because of a
possibility that one co-defendant informed on himself and others there was
no "genuine issue" of affiant veracity.
Cox is unclear and will cause further confusion because it is difficult to
determine whether the majority is finding (1) a failure of the defendant to
properly plead (or to cure improper pleadings), (2) a failure to put on a prima
facie case of affiant untruthfulness, or (3) a failure to meet proof standards.
In light of the evidence adduced, if the court is suggesting that the
degree of specificity required to create a genuine issue of affiant veracity is
greater than that found in Cox, the decision as a practical matter vitiates
Melson. If the court is suggesting that there was an absence of a prima facie
case, Melson is also rendered of little value. If the court rules as it did
because it did not believe the defendants had met their burden of proof, the
opinion gives no guidance to counsel or trial courts in determining the nature
of that burden of proof. Burden of proof considerations should not obscure
the Melson-Giordano rationale as to when a defendant should have an
opportunity to traverse affiant veracity.
Persons lying within the judicial process should be of utmost concern
to the court and should be given careful scrutiny. 30 Melson-Giordano was a
significant step forward in allowing such scrutiny. Cox appears to raise
serious doubts about the continuing validity of those decisions. If the court
determines that the question of affiant veracity is not worthy of judicial
supervision, it should say so directly; not, as in Cox, through obfuscation.
"HOT PURSUIT" SEARCHES
State v. Wyatt 3 1 contains disturbing language with respect to the nature
of the "hot pursuit" exception to the search warrant requirement. In Wyatt,
two police officers were hailed by a loan company officer who had just been
robbed. The victim pointed out the defendant who was entering a residence
a short distance away. According to the majority opinion, when the officers
arrived at the house they secured permission from "an occupant" sitting on
30. Permitting perjury in judicial proceedings was one of the primary considera-
tions in not applying the Miranda rationale to impeachment. See United States v.
Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
31. 327 So. 2d 401 (La. 1976).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
the porch "to enter." 31 The defendant was found within and placed under
arrest. Another officer searched inside a refrigerator and found a bag filled
with money. In addition, an identifying shirt was found "in a pile of
clothes" and a weapon on the mantel piece.
The question of whether there was a consent "to search" is not clearly
treated in the opinion. 33 Of course, if there was proper consent to search, the
consideration of "hot pursuit" is unnecessary dicta. The majority unfortu-
nately does not make that clear but does conclude that, "the items here were
constitutionally seized in the exigencies of hot pursuit." 3 4 Mere use of the
term "hot pursuit" should not become an incantation authorizing searching
for evidence. While the court relied upon Warden v. Hayden,35 one of the
broadest applications of the "hot pursuit exception," there was little factual
analysis which would support such reliance. Hayden emphasized that the
exception was authorized because the search was "part of an effort to find a
suspected felon, armed, within the house into which he had run."
36
Further, the allowance of the search in Hayden was predicated largely
upon the consideration that to delay "would gravely endanger the lives of
others. Speed. . . was essential, and only a thorough search of the house
for persons and weapons could have insured that Hayden was the only man
present and that the police had control of all weapons which could be used
against them to effect an escape.' '37
The reported facts simply do not support a search inside a refrigerator
based upon a hot pursuit exigency. The burden of proving an exception to
the search warrant requirement is upon the state .38 Mere invocation of the
conclusion "hot pursuit" without a clear factual basis to support the
exigency rationale upon which that "exception" is predicated should not be
allowed.
A STATE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
State v. Mora39 raises, but certainly does not lay to rest, the question of
32. Id. at 402.
33. See, for example, the discrepancy between "to enter" at page 402 of the
decision and "to enter" and "to search" at page 404 of the decision. The majority
opinion appears to assume that the consent to enter included consent to search. See
also id. at 405 (Tate & Calegero, JJ., dissenting).
34. Id. at 404.
35. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
36. Id. at 299 (Emphasis added).
37. Id.
38. See note 12, supra.
39. 307 So. 2d 317 (La. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), 330 So. 2d 900 (La.
1976) (on remand), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 538 (1977).
[Vol. 37
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whether Louisiana has an exclusionary rule independent of that in Mapp v.
Ohio .A0 In light of the apparent trend in the United States Supreme Court
toward diluting Mapp,4 1 the problem may become of critical importance.
The United States Supreme Court remanded Mora for clarification of
whether the decision was predicated on state or federal law grounds. 42 Two
possible federal questions were presented: whether the actions of a school
official constituted "state action" under the fourteenth amendment and
whether the search and seizure was unconstitutional. Both questions would
be of no moment in the criminal proceeding if there were no exclusionary
rule.
Justice Dennis writing for the majority indicated that the "state
action" finding was based upon an analysis of state statutory law and that
the search and seizure was unconstitutional under "both" Article 1, Section
7 of the 1921 Louisiana Constitution, and the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution. He concluded that "suppression of the seized
marijuana was mandated under the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio
''43
Justice Dixon briefly-but perhaps very signficantly-concurred,
"the exclusionary rule at the time of the search was embodied in C.Cr.P.
703 and is now contained in Art. 1, Sec. 5, La.Const. 1974,." 44
Aside from Justice Dixon's concurrence, it is not clear whether the
majority opinion reflects adherence to the view that there exists an exclu-
sionary rule predicated upon state constitutional grounds. The reference to
Mapp v. Ohio after reference to both the Louisiana and federal constitutions
makes it unclear that the exclusionary rule would attach to state constitution-
al error alone. If, however, as Justice Dixon notes, there is a distinct
exclusionary rule in Article 1, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974, the unclear reference is not critical. Article 1, Section 5 provides in
part, "[a] ny person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in
violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the
appropriate court." Clearly, this provision expanded the class of persons
having standing in search and seizure situations45 and consequently ex-
40. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
41. See, e.g., Powell v. Stone, 96 S.Ct. 3037 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 405 (1975).
42. 423 U.S. 809 (1975).
43. 330 So. 2d at 901.
44. Id. at 902 (Emphasis added).
45. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960). See also Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1974).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
panded the scope of the exclusionary rule. Thus, by expanding standing
Louisiana created an exclusionary rule which would not be available under
Mapp. It thus does not appear reasonable to assume that absent the Mapp
exclusionary rule there would be no Louisiana exclusionary rule. Louisiana,
through the quoted sentence, now has an exclusionary rule not wed to Mapp
for persons who would not have standing to raise Mapp exclusion. While
the question has not been directly addressed in light of having an exclusion-
ary rule beyond Mapp, it is difficult indeed to argue that Louisiana does not
have an independent exclusionary rule for persons presently included within
Mapp exclusionary policy.'
In light of the changing attitude of the United States Supreme Court to
exclusionary policy, California47 and Hawaii4 8 have already adopted state
exclusionary policy beyond that of the United States Supreme Court. Article
1, Section 5 of the 1974 Constitution appears to mandate that Louisiana do
the same.
VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSIONS
The statutory burden of proof requirements in determining the volun-
tariness of statements were considered in State v. Whatley. 49 Although the
mother of the defendant testified that her son had bruises and had com-
plained of being beaten, the defendant did not testify.5° Law enforcement
personnel present at the interrogation testified that no beatings or coercion
took place in their presence. Defendant argued that the failure of the state to
call officers who could testify regarding maltreatment during the entire
lockup period did not satisfy the burden of proof requirements. The court
rejected this contention on the ground that the defendant himself failed to
testify to such maltreatment. Such a position appears correct since the state
should not be required to negative coercion at every custodial state with
specific testimony when the defendant fails to specify when and how the
coercion took place. Simple considerations of "fair notice" including
specificity should prevail. 5 1
The decision also indicates that when the court finds the confession
admissible the defendant should be allowed to put on" evidence going to the
46. 330 So. 2d at 904.
47. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
48. State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974).
49. 320 So. 2d 123 (La. 1975).
50. Of course, such testimony could not have been used at the trial on the merits.
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
51. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Pre-
trial Criminal Procedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 575, 598 (1976).
[Vol. 37
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weight of the confession contemporaneously"52 with the state's evidence
introduced as a foundation for its admissibility. The contemplated proce-
dure would allow the defense to present evidence relating to weight-in
addition to cross-examination-at the time the state is laying the foundation
for admissibility to the jury.
Such an approach eliminates staleness problems when the state's case
in chief is lengthy and might more accurately reflect the weight to be given
the confession at the outset. Since a confession is so qualitatively different
as evidence, it should be given distinct consideration in terms of impact and
probative value in the jurors' minds. The only articulated bases for this
somewhat novel procedure are "practical efficiency and fairness" and that
it is the current practice of some trial judges. 53
State v. Callihan54 reflects a stringent interpretation of the require-
ments of Miranda v. Arizona5 in determining whether a statement is
"voluntary." Defendant was given the warnings required by Miranda only
after he informed the deputies he would make a statement. His court-
appointed attorney gave the warnings. The 4-3 majority relied upon
Westover v. United States ,56 a companion case to Miranda, where state
officials failed to give warnings but turned the defendant over to federal
officials who did. The United States Supreme Court concluded in part,
"[d]espite the fact that the FBI agents gave warnings at the outset of their
interview, from Westover's point of view the warnings came at the end of
the interrogation process. ' '57
Justice Dixon concluded that Callihan was like Westover and rejected
a distinction based upon the fact that an attorney had intervened. "The fact
that a lawyer was called at this point to advise the defendant that he did not
have to make statements cannot serve to render the statements
admissible. "58
Then significantly, Justice Dixon cited cases relying upon LA. R.S.
15:451, LA. R.S. 15:452 and LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 703 relating to the
52. 320 So. 2d at 128 (Emphasis added).
53. Id.
54. 320 So. 2d 155 (La. 1975).
55. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
56. Id. at 494.
57. Id.
58. The decision fails to deal directly with the standards applied for purging the
defect of failure to give Miranda warnings at the outset of interrogation, when they
are subsequently given. Certainly at some point under Miranda this defect should be
considered vitiated by intervening acts. See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
(1976). Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963).
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burden of proof requirements for establishing voluntariness of statements
and concluded, "[o]ne of those legal requirements [of voluntariness] is that
the defendant be given the 'Miranda' warnings before custodial interroga-
tion begins.'' 5
9
This treatment is noteworthy for it has apparently introduced a per se
requirement of giving Miranda warnings as a foundation for establishing a
voluntary statement. If the Supreme Court retreats from its position of
exclusion under the "prophylactic" procedures of Miranda, Louisiana
may still require the Miranda warnings under the "free and voluntary"
standard.
Moreover, Article 1, Section 13 of the 1974 Constitution60 essentially
requires that the Miranda warnings be given when a person has been
"detained in connection with the investigation ... of any offense." That
article does not have an express exclusionary rule, nor does it clearly equate
the detention language to Miranda's "custodial interrogation." The posi-
tion announced in Whatley may allow avoidance of both of these questions.
Insofar as Article 1, Section 13 goes beyond Miranda the questions of
independent exclusion and when the rights arise will, of course, have to be
addressed.
PRE-TRIAL ACCESS TO PROSECUTOR'S EVIDENCE
Last year this writer suggested that Barnard v. Henderson 61 might
well lead to the pre-trial inspection of any "critical" physical evidence
subject to expert evaluation. 62 It appears that conclusion was wrong, at least
for the present time. In several cases this term the court has taken a very
restrictive view of the due process requirements for pre-trial inspection of
physical evidence.
In State v. White,63 the defendant had requested, in a second degree
murder trial, "to examine all gun pellets that may have been recovered
. ... " The court cryptically distinguished Barnard on the grounds that
unlike Barnard where the pellets had been seriously damaged, "in the
59. 320 So. 2d at 158.
60. LA. CONST. art. I, § 13 provides: "When any person has been arrested or
detained in connection with the investigation or commission of any offense, he shall
be advised fully of the reason for his arrest or detention, his right to remain silent, his
right against self incrimination, his right to the assistance of counsel and, if indigent,
his right to court appointed counsel."
61. 514 F.2d 744 (1975).
62. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-75 Term-Pre-trial
Criminal Procedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 575, 597 (1976).
63. 321 So. 2d 491, 493 (La. 1975).
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present case, the bullets were not badly damaged, permitting a quick
comparison under a dual microscope at trial."'6
The defendant in State v. Brumfield65 sought access to all physical
evidence in order that it could be "properly inspected and examined by an
expert." Included in the list was a pistol, the spent cartridges and slugs. The
court again rejected an application of Barnard. This time the conclusion
was that "the controverted question was not whether the gun and cartridges
were used in killing the victim; the real question was which of three persons
did the shooting."' The ease of making comparisons during trial, "with
the aid of a dual microscope" 67 again was noted.
Finally, State v. Roberts,68 in upholding the denial of pre-trial access
to a pistol and bullets, concluded that "the ballistic testing is not shown to
have been useful for the accused's defense. The accused's defense did not
deny that the pistol found . . . had fired the fatal shot.'"69 The court
emphasized, "such ballistic testing is not shown to have been relevant to
any issue of the accused's defense."- 70
These cases suggest that unless the issue as to which examination is
requested prior to trial is shown to be of significance at trial then there is no
right to inspect. Such a test is adequate for questions of reversible error, but
gives no real guidance at the pre-trial stage since at that stage the question of
the nature of defense may not be fully known. It is suggested that these
strained and facile distinctions 71 should be questioned and that judicial or
legislative guidelines be adopted to inform the trial court and the parties of
the nature of pre-trial inspections of physical evidence without reference to
what actually happened at trial. The matter cannot be dealt with properly in
terms of reversible error. Meaningful and sensible guidelines would greatly
enhance judicial efficiency as well as fairness to the parties.
The continued reluctance to judicially approve pre-trial discovery was
evidenced in State v. Ball.72 The court, relying upon past decisions which
64. Id. at 494.
65. 329 So. 2d 181 (La. 1976).
66. Id. at 185 (Emphasis added).
67. Id.
68. 331 So. 2d I (La. 1976).
69. Id. at 14 (Emphasis added).
70. Id. (Emphasis added).
71. It is suggested that it is unrealistic to assume that the question of whether a
particular weapon or bullet was used in the crime is not relevant. The state introduces
the weapon to show how the crime took place at the instance of the defendant. The
defendant should have the opportunity to cross-examine fully with respect to the
state's introduction of such evidence.
72. 328 So. 2d 81 (La. 1976).
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are concisely summarized in State v. Collins ,3 denied pre-trial discovery of
lab reports, a copy of a line-up photograph and copies of witness statements.
While under present jurisprudence there is no quarrel with the court's
decision to refuse to grant the right of discovery, the additional reason
advanced that such discovery was precluded by LA. R.S. 44:1 et seq.
(Public Records Law) is not well founded.
As Justice Tate points out in his concurring opinion, the dicta's
reliance upon the Public Records Act is misplaced. That act is designed to
recognize the right of the public to certain records without judicial interven-
tion. Justice Tate properly concludes "the act does not and was not intended
to create a privilege from production of such records for valid judicial
purposes." 7 4 Justice Dixon also properly concludes, "The Public Records
Act is misinterpreted by the majority and is irrelevant to the issues of this
case."
75
There are enough legitimate issues involved in the question of judicial
determination of proper pre-trial criminal discovery without adding a
misconception of the nature of a Public Records Act, which is designed
solely to afford public access to enumerated records without the necessity of
judicial intervention. The Public Records Act is simply irrelevant to
questions of judicially supervised pre-trial discovery.
BILL OF PARTICULARS
State v. Miller7 6 is significant for its delineation of the elements of a
bill of particulars required sufficiently to apprise a defendant of the nature of
the crime charged. The defendant was accused of "a series of thefts of
lawful U.S. currency in excess of $500, the property of the First Circuit
Court of Appeal, State of Louisiana." 77 After moving to quash on the
ground of vagueness, the defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars
asking, inter alia, (1) the number of alleged acts of misappropriation and (2)
the place of each alleged act of misappropriation. The state refused to
answer these two questions and the trial court refused to order answers.
In a well-written opinion, Justice Calogero speaking for the 4-3
majority reversed the conviction. His analysis of the purpose of the bill of
particulars properly indicates that the extent to which the bill should be
73. 308 So. 2d 263 (La. 1975).
74. 328 So. 2d at 85 (Tate, J., concurring).
75. Id. Justice Calogero also concurred without reasons.
76. 319 So. 2d 339 (La. 1975).
77. Id. at 341.
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granted depends upon the complexity of the case and whether the case is
predicated upon a single event or a series of events. It was recognized that
"there is no exact formula . . . which can be applied to every charge to
determine in a particular case whether a defendant has all the information to
which he is constitutionally entitled." 78 The constitutional standard is that
the defendant "shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.' '
79
The court rejected the state's contention that answering the bill of
particulars as to the number of acts of misappropriation and the place of
misappropriation would require disclosure of evidence and thus was not
required by way of a bill of particulars. In disposing of this contention the
court noted, "to the extent that information is properly elicited to give
defendant notice of the nature and cause of the charge against him, the state
is required to respond to a bill of particulars even though the answers will
disclose facts which the state intends to establish through evidence. "80
Miller provides a classic example of the proper use of the bill of
particulars to apprise the defendant adequately of the nature of the charge. It
clearly and importantly recognizes that the trial court may not assume that
the defendant knows anything about the crime of which he is accused except
what is contained in the indictment as amplified by a bill of particulars. In
light of an apparent willingness of trial courts in the past to assume the
defendant "knows what he's charged with" Miller is significant. Its
significance is amplified as long as pre-trial discovery is limited.
NEW COURT-CREATED PROCEDURES
Remand for a New Motion to Suppress
A new procedural device, a remand for a new motion to suppress, was
created in State v. Simmons .81 The court determined that the trial court had
improperly handled the question of burden of proof with respect to voluntar-
iness of confessions. Instead of reversing and remanding for a new trial, the
court concluded,
Since we find no trial error except that on the motion to suppress,
it is not necessary at this time to reverse the convictions and order a new
trial, because the error might be eliminated upon another trial of the
motion to suppress . . . . We reserve to the trial judge the power to
78. Id. at 343.
79. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 13. La. Const. art. 1, § 10(1921). Seealso State v. Clark,
288 So. 2d 612 (La. 1974).
80. 319 So. 2d at 343 (Emphasis added).
81. 328 So. 2d 149 (La. 1976).
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grant a new trial should he determine the confession inadmissible
. . . . If on the other hand, the trial judge determines, after a hearing
on the motion to suppress, that the confession is admissible, the right to
appeal from such ruling is reserved to the defendant.82
This new approach promotes judicial efficiency. Instead of requiring a
new trial at which the evidence might again be presented after an error-free
suppression hearing, the remand for a new hearing eliminates the unneces-
sary trial when the evidence is properly determined to be admissible while at
the same time affording the same review procedures to the state and
defendant.
Co-Conspiracy Hearings
There appears to be an increasing use of LA. R.S. 15:455 which allows
introduction into evidence of certain statements by co-conspirators which
have an incriminating effect. State v. Carter 83 requires that the issue of the
existence of a conspiracy must be determined outside the presence of the
jury. Justice Dixon in a well-reasoned opinion concludes,
Where the State seeks to introduce evidence of the acts of declarations
of one conspirator against another, the existence of a conspiracy
between them is a mixed question of law and fact. The trial court must
determine whether a prima facie showing has been made in order to
determine whether a defendant will be charged with responsibility for
the acts and declaration of another. After such initial determination,
the existence of the conspiracy becomes a question of fact for the jury
'84
Since a separate hearing outside the presence of the jury must be held,
such a hearing should be held before trial whenever possible. This of course
would create a pre-trial device similar to the motion to suppress. Judicial
efficiency and fair notice alone mandate such a procedure. Moreover, the
state has as much interest as the defendant in knowing in advance of trial
whether a co-conspirator's statement will be admitted. In the event discov-
ery of such statements becomes either legislatively or jurisprudentially
82. Id. at 153. Only Justice Marcus questioned the procedure; Justice Sanders
dissented without reason.
83. 326 So. 2d 848 (La. 1975).
84. Id. at 852 (Emphasis added). With respect to the merits of the hearsay, the
court further recognized that when the showing "that two people committed a crime
is showing that defendant either committed or conspired to commit the criminal act,
no prima facie case of conspiracy has been established. . . the fact, alone, that two
or more have committed the crime charged is not sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of conspiracy."
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required, a pre-trial co-conspiracy hearing procedure should be adopted to
prevent the inefficiency and inconvenience which results from moving the
jury in and out of the courtroom and delaying the trial.
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS
The nature of the Louisiana preliminary examination was discussed in
State v. Jenkins.85 The majority announced that the hearing is to be "full
blown and adversary. . . one in which the defendant is entitled to confront
witnesses against him and to have full cross-examination of them.' '86
Justice Dennis, who wrote for the majority and who was a delegate to the
constitutional convention,87 indicated that the state constitutional right to a
preliminary examination was signficiantly different from the federal con-
stitutional right to a preliminary hearing described in Gerstein v. Pugh.8
The convention in drafting this article [Art. 1, Sec. 14] contem-
plated the type of formal, adversary proceeding provided for by our
Code, including the right to subpoena and cross-examine witnesses
. . .The elevation of the right to a preliminary examination reflects a
recognition by the people of Louisiana of the importance of according
an accused a prompt and thorough determination that there is sufficient
cause to deprive him of his liberty.
89
This interpretation of legislative intent is supported by the fact that
prior preliminary examination practice in Louisiana involved a full-blown,
adversary proceeding and that Pugh v. Rainwater,9° as decided by the Fifth
Circuit, also contemplated such a preliminary examination. It should not be
forgotten that at the time of the constitutional convention the delegates were
considering the prior practice and the Fifth Circuit's opinion, not that of the
subsequently decided Gerstein v. Pugh reflecting a lesser federal constitu-
tional standard. 91
85. 338 So. 2d 276 (La. 1976).
86. Id. at 279.
87. Justice Tate who did not write a separate opinion also was a delegate.
88. 420 U.S. 103, 111 et seq. (1975).
89. 338 So. 2d at 279 (Emphasis added).
90. 483 F.2d 778 (Sth Cir. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), on remand, 511 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1975)
91. That there was no express legislative intent to change prior evidentiary
practices is reflected by the comments of Delegate Burson". .. it is certainly not the
intent of the framers of this amendment to restrict any rights that you have under the
present law. It is only to expand the rights of the defendant in the limited instances
where he is charged by means of a Bill of Information." Documents of the Louisiana
Constitutional Convention of 1973 Relative to the Administration of CriminalJustice
717 (47th Day's Proceedings, September 14, 1973). See also id. at 716 (discussion of
Delegate Roy).
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Having announced the "full blown and adversary" nature of the
preliminary hearing, Jenkins does not completely eliminate the use of
hearsay evidence, a point which has been of considerable dispute. 92 Rather,
the opinion suggests that , "[t]hese provisions ... generally comport with
the more recent A.L.I. Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
330.4(4), which would apply all the rules of evidence from trials in criminal
cases to the preliminary examination, with some limited exceptions to the
rule against admitting hearsay evidence." 93
Because the court does not include the relied upon portion of the A.L.I.
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment procedure, it is set forth here.
(4) Rules of Evidence. The rules of evidence for trial of criminal
cases shall apply at ths preliminary hearing, except that hearsay
evidence that would not be admissible at trial shall be admitted if the
court determines that it would impose an unreasonable burden on one
of the parties or on a witness to require that the primary source of the
evidence be produced at the hearing, and if the witness furnishes
information bearing on the informant's reliability and, as far as
possible, the means by which the information was obtained. When
hearsay evidence is admitted, the court, in determining the existence of
reasonable cause, shall consider
(a) the extent to which the hearsay quality of the evidence
affects the weight it should be given, and
(b) the likelihood of evidence other than hearsay being
available at trial to provide the information furnished
by hearsay at the preliminary hearing.
This writer feels that 330.4(4) of the A.L.I. Code or Rule 344(f) of the
Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure (1974) 94 present a balanced approach
92. See Justice Barham's vigorous dissent in denial of writs in State v. Perkins,
316 So. 2d 385 (La. 1975).
93. 338 So. 2d at 279 (Emphasis added). The "generally comport" language
appears to be a normative conclusion that the new A.L.I. provisions are appropriate.
Strict statutory analysis does not support such a conclusion in light of the failure of
the earlier A.L.I. Model Code to deal with the questions.
94. (f) Evidence. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by
unlawful means are not properly made at the detention hearing. Hearsay evidence
may be received, if there is a substantial basis for believing:
(I) That the source of the hearsay is credible;
(2) That there is a factual basis for the information furnished; and
(3) If the evidence concerns whether there is probable cause to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it, that it would
impose an unreasonable burden on one of the parties or on a witness to require
that the primary source of the evidence be produced at the hearing. UNIFORM
RULES OF CRIM. P., rule 334(b) (1974) (Emphasis added).
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to the hearsay evidence admissibility question. They do not make hearsay
admissible unless (1) an unreasonable burden in producing the primary
source is shown and (2) the testifying party furnishes information bearing
upon the declarant's credibility and (3) when possible, the reliability of the
manner in which the information is obtained.95 Even when these tests are
met the court must weigh the hearsay evidence and determine the likelihood
that admissible evidence will be presented at trial. If Jenkins reflects the
court's future position, it would be error to say that, as a routine matter,
hearsay is admissible at a preliminary examination. Rather, it appears there
is a new "hearsay exception" for which, as in all exceptions, a proper
foundation [Section 330.4(4) considerations] must be laid.
95. This second requirement is analogous to the crediting of hearsay in Aguilar-
Spinelli. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-
Pre-trial Criminal Procedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 575, 579 (1976).
